Cheating? The Case of Producers' Under-Reporting Behavior in Hog Insurance in China

文献类型： 外文期刊

第一作者： Zhang, Yuehua

作者： Zhang, Yuehua;Zhang, Yuehua;Cao, Ying;Wang, H. Holly;Wang, H. Holly

作者机构：

期刊名称：CANADIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D AGROECONOMIE （ 影响因子：1.396； 五年影响因子：1.531 ）

ISSN： 0008-3976

年卷期： 2018 年 66 卷 3 期

页码：

收录情况： SCI

摘要： Information asymmetry exists in virtually every insurance setting. The institutional arrangement of hog insurance in China offers a unique opportunity to investigate the farmer's behavior of under-reporting the actual number of finished hogs on one hand, and the insurer's efficiency in determining the actual numbers on the other. Using data on 444 hog operators synchronized from farm production survey and insurance records, results showed that farmers report on average 11.5% fewer hogs to the insurance company. The level of under-reporting is positively associated with the size of operation. Farmers with longer farming experience and more conservative risk attitude report more accurately. The under-report behavior is also partially attributed to a farmer's limited capacity of accurate estimation. Due to information barrier, the insurance company is only able to recover 18.6% of the under-report at the indemnity payment stage. Results are robust after controlling for potential sample selection problems. It is suggested that technical supports, public programs and premium incentive designs in repeated insurance should be considered to promote more accurate reports.

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