文献类型： 外文期刊

作者： Lu, Xinhai ¹ ; Yang, Chuan ¹ ; Ma, Wangrong ¹ ; Yang, Hao ³ ;

作者机构： 1.Cent China Normal Univ, Sch Publ Adm, Wuhan 430079, Hubei, Peoples R China

2.Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Publ Adm, Wuhan 430074, Hubei, Peoples R China

3.Guangdong Acad Agr Sci, Inst Agr Econ & Informat, Guangzhou 510000, Guangdong, Peoples R China

关键词： Green building; Stakeholder; Evolutionary game; Taxation; Subsidies

期刊名称：ENERGY AND BUILDINGS （ 影响因子：7.1； 五年影响因子：7.3 ）

ISSN： 0378-7788

年卷期： 2025 年 336 卷

页码：

收录情况： SCI

摘要： Many countries have implemented economic plan and subsidy policies to encourage green building development. This paper constructs an evolutionary game model between governments and developers to examine the impact of government-led incentives on the decision-making process of developers within the dynamic trajectory of green building industry. Considering the purchasing preference of homebuyers, this study aims at to evaluate the impact of incentive policies on the transition to green building, examining three distinct scenarios: the static incentives, the dynamic taxation and the dynamic subsidies. The evolutionary stable strategy between governments and developers is derived. Then, a numerical simulation is employed to demonstrate the dynamic evolution process. The findings indicate that there is no evolutionary stable strategy under static scenario. When the government actively supervises the transition of green buildings and adopts dynamic incentive measures, the evolutionary game demonstrates stability. Furthermore, the simulation result shows that a policy of dynamic subsidies is more effective for the transition to green buildings than alternative incentive strategies. These findings offer a foundation for policymakers to facilitate the transition to green building.