文献类型： 会议论文

第一作者： WANG Jinping

作者： WANG Jinping ¹ ; WANG Zhaogang ² ; XU Mingsheng ³ ;

作者机构： 1.Bank of Dalian, Dalian, China, 116001

2.School of International Business Communication DUFE, Dalian, China, 116001

3.Bank of Dalian, Dalian, China, 116001,Institute of Finance and Banking, CASS, Beijing, China, 100081,Postdoctoral Programme Center, Bank of Dalian, Dalian, China, 116001

关键词： deposit insurance;economic growth;financial stability;moral hazard

会议名称： International conferece on financial risk and corporate finance managament

主办单位：

页码： 141-147

摘要： Deposit Insurance schemes provide guarantee for residents' deposits, therefore it does not only turn unstable savings into stable deposits, but also generates "derived deposit" as a result of the new circumstance. Consequently, it will also boost economic growth, lower the probability of bank runs, stabilize the financial system effectively and reduce the tremendous social cost that results from the chaos in the financial system. However, it will also involve moral hazard, particularly under the condition of single fixed premium rate. Adverse selection in most cases leaves deposit insurance institutions the source of exposure. We must take a dialectic view at the moral hazard in deposit insurance, channel relevant actions according to circumstances and take corresponding precautions to minimize the negative effects of moral hazard.

分类号： F831`F831