文献类型: 外文期刊
作者: Cui, Shiliang 1 ; Li, Kaili 2 ; Yang, Luyi 3 ; Wang, Jinting 4 ;
作者机构: 1.Georgetown Univ, McDonough Sch Business, Washington, DC 20057 USA
2.Beijing Univ Chem Technol, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100029, Peoples R China
3.Univ Calif Berkeley, Haas Sch Business, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
4.Cent Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Management Sci & Engn, Beijing 100081, Peoples R China
关键词: shared mobility; HOV; carpool; welfare; equilibrium; social optimum; emissions
期刊名称:M&SOM-MANUFACTURING & SERVICE OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT ( 影响因子:7.6; 五年影响因子:7.609 )
ISSN: 1523-4614
年卷期:
页码:
收录情况: SCI
摘要: Problem definition: "Slugging," or casual carpooling, refers to the commuting practice of drivers picking up passengers at designated locations and offering them a free ride in order to qualify for high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes. Academic/practical relevance: It is estimated that tens of thousands of daily commuters rely on slugging to go to work in major U.S. cities. As drivers save commute time and passengers ride for free, slugging can be a promising Smart Mobility solution. However, little is known about the welfare, policy, and environmental implications of slugging. Methodology: We develop a stylized model that captures the essence of slugging. We characterize commuters' equilibrium behavior in the model. Results: We find that slugging indeed makes commuters better off. However, the widely observed free-ride tradition is socially suboptimal. As compared with the social optimum, commuters always underslug in the free-slugging equilibrium when highway travel time is insensitive to slugging activities but may overslug otherwise. The socially optimal outcome can be achieved by allowing pecuniary exchanges between drivers and passengers. Interestingly, passengers may be better off if they pay for a ride than if they do not under free slugging. We also find that although policy initiatives to expand highway capacity or improve public transportation always increase social welfare in the absence of slugging, they may reduce social welfare in areas where free slugging is a major commuting choice. Nevertheless, these unintended consequences would be mitigated by the introduction of pecuniary exchanges. Finally, contrary to conventional wisdom, slugging as a form of carpooling can result in more cars on the road and thus, more carbon emissions. Managerial implications: Our results call upon the slugging community to rethink the free-ride practice. We also caution that slugging benefits commutrs possibly to the detriment of the environment.
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