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Pooling Agents for Customer-Intensive Services

文献类型: 外文期刊

作者: Wang, Zhongbin 1 ; Yang, Luyi 2 ; Cui, Shiliang 3 ; Ulku, Sezer 3 ; Zhou, Yong-Pin 4 ;

作者机构: 1.Tianjin Univ, Coll Management & Econ, Tianjin 300072, Peoples R China

2.Univ Calif Berkeley, Haas Sch Business, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA

3.Georgetown Univ, McDonough Sch Business, Washington, DC 20057 USA

4.Univ Washington, Foster Sch Business, Seattle, WA 98195 USA

关键词: quality-speed tradeoff; pooling; pay-for-performance; strategic server; customer satisfaction; agent payoff

期刊名称:OPERATIONS RESEARCH ( 影响因子:2.7; 五年影响因子:3.9 )

ISSN: 0030-364X

年卷期: 2023 年 71 卷 3 期

页码:

收录情况: SCI

摘要: In customer-intensive services where service quality increases with service time, service providers commonly pool their agents and give performance bonuses that reward agents for achieving greater customer satisfaction and serving more customers. Conventional wisdom suggests that pooling agents reduce customer wait time while performance bonuses motivate agents to produce high-quality service, both of which should boost customer satisfaction. However, our queueing-game-theoretic analysis reveals that when agents act strategically, they may choose to speed up under pooling in an attempt to serve more customers, thus undermining service quality. If this happens, pooling can backfire and result in both lower customer satisfaction and agent payoff. We propose a simple solution to resolve this issue: pooling a portion of the performance bonuses (incentive pooling) in conjunction with pooling agents (operational pooling).

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[1]Pooling Agents for Customer-Intensive Services. Wang, Zhongbin,Yang, Luyi,Cui, Shiliang,Ulku, Sezer,Zhou, Yong-Pin.

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